THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
From the foregoing discussion the decision in the principal case seems wrong. Not
only was the offer solicited by the agent of the steel company, but the home office engaged in correspondence with the plaintiff which might have been interpreted to indicate that the only obstacle in the way of final approval was the settlement of the old
account. Since the jury had decided that the circumstances warranted an inference of
assent, the court should have permitted its verdict to stand.19
Family Relations-Wrongful Death-Action by Administrator of Estate of Minor
Child against Unemancipated Brother-[Wisconsin].-An unemancipated minor,
driving his father's automobile, negligently caused the death of his six year old brother.
The special administrator of the estate of the deceased minor brought suit under the
wrongful death statute' against the brother and the father's insurance company, on a
liability policy which by statutory requirement 2 inured to the benefit of anyone
driving the automobile with the owner's consent. The death statute making the
parents beneficiaries limited recovery to those situations in which the deceased could
have recovered had he survived. Held, recovery will not be denied because the suit is
between members of a family, but since the father is precluded from benefiting because
of an express clause in the policy, only the mother's share of the damages will be
awarded. Munsert v. FarmersMutual Autonobile Ins. Co.3
The once uniformly established rule that no personal injury actions4 could be maintained between members of a family is said to be predicated on the desirability of
preserving parental authority and domestic tranquillity.s It seems obvious that in
19Cavanaugh v. D. W. Ranlet Co.,
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Mass. 366, ii8 N.E. 65o (i9i8).

xWis. Stats., 1937, § 331.03, 331.04.
2 Wis. Stats., 1937, § 204.30, 204.33.

3 281 N.W. 671 (Wis. 1938).
Generally actions arising under wrongful death statutes involve the same principles since
they are based upon the right of the deceased to have maintained an action for personal
injuries had he survived: Ergery v. Rochester Telephone Corp., 271 N.Y. 306, 3 N.E. (2d) 434
(1936); Pieczonka v. Pullman Co., 89 F. (2d) 353 (C.C.A. 2d 1937); Lynch v. Lynch, 195 At.
799 (Del. 1937).
5It is generally held that one spouse may not maintain a personal injury action against
the other: Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 6i (igio); Aldrich v. Tracy, 222 Iowa 84, 269
N.W. 30 (1936); Anthony v. Anthony, x35 Me. 54, 188 Atl. 724 (1937); David v. David, i61
Md. 532, 157 Atl. 755 (1932) (wife barred from suing partnership of which husband was a
member). A parent may not sue his minor child for personal injury: Duffy v. Duffy, 117 Pa.
Super. 500, 178 At. 165 (1935); Turner v. Carter, i69 Tenn. 553, 89 S.W. (2d) 751 (x936);
Cafaro v. Cafaro, 1i8 N.J.L. 123, i9 Ad. 472 (1937). And a minor child may not sue its
parent: Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (18gi); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212
N.W. 787 (1927); Luster v. Luster, 13 N.E. (2d) 438 (Mass. 1938). For the effect of emancipation and the reaching of majority see: Farrar v. Farrar, 41 Ga. App. 120, 152 S.E. 278
(1930); Goldstein v. Goldstein, 4 N.J. Misc. 711, x34 AU. 184 (1926); McCurdy, Torts be4

tween Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1030 (1930); r8 Boston U.L. Rev. 468
(1938); 26 Geo. L.J. 139 (1937); 86 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 909 (1938).

Generally if a person is precluded from direct recovery for personal injury because he and
the tortfeasor are members of a family group, he cannot recover from the employer of the
tortfeasor: Maine v. James Maine & Sons Co., z98 Iowa 1278, 2oi N.W. 20 (1924); Riser v.
Riser, 240 Mich. 402, 215 N.W. 290 (1927); Emerson v. Western Seed & Irrigation Co., IT6
Neb. iSo, 216 N.W. 297 (1927).
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allowing a suit between members of a family, the court is not causing the friction, but
providing an orderly method of solving a difficulty that has already arisen. But in the
line of cases represented by Dunlapv. Dunlap6 a partial recognition of this rationalization resulted in an unfortunate basis for permitting recovery. There the court said
that where an insurance company was being sued, no family discord would result,
and therefore the court allowed recovery on a liability policy while recognizing that
had an insurance company not been involved, an action could not have been maintained. The court dearly did violence to the theory of liability insurance on which
underwriters compute their risk.7 The administrator in the instant case could not recover under the statute for the benefit of the mother who was the real party in interest
unless the deceased could have maintained the action had he survived. Thus, to reach
the result that it did, the court had to approve a suit by a mother against her minor
son and also one between minor brothers.8
A serious objection to the result obtained is that the recovery here is changing the
character of the policy from that of liability to the more costly accident type. This
argument proceeds upon the assumption that the father is the sole support of a family
and to allow recovery on the policy is not absolving him from a new legal liability,
but in effect providing him with a windfall by paying the money to a member of his
family and therefore indirectly to him. The difficulty with this position is that in the
modem family the father is not in fact necessarily the sole support and secondly an
injury to the member of his family such as a loss of limb or sight is not the type that
the father would, and in most cases could, adequately compensate for. The court
should provide for the loss of earning power to the child or other family member by
setting up a trust of the insurance sum to take care of the child when the father's
support is not forthcoming.9 While it is easier to see the desirability of this result in
the case of, for example, a loss of a limb of a child, yet in light of the expressed legislative policy in favor of giving the mother compensation for the death of her child, it is
hard to see why recovery should be denied her on the ground that the father may get
some benefit from the money.
The manner in which the rule has been broken down is an interesting illustration
of the judicial process. The rule first lost favor where the injury was wilfully inflicted,!o
and now several jurisdictions allow damages even for negligent injury. Where negli6 84 N.H. 352, i5o Ati. 9o5 (1930). In accord: Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538
(1932); Ruiz v. Clancy, 182 La. 935, r62 So. 734 (1935).

7 Mesite v. Kirchenstein, iog Conn. 77, 85, i45 Ad. 753, 755 (I929); Schneider v. Schneider,
16o Md. x8, 152 Ad. 498 (x93o); Owens v. Auto Mut. Indemnity Co., 235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133

(1937).

8There has been no authority on injury suits between minor brothers but in Beilke v.
Knaack, 207 Wis. 490, 242 N.W. 176 (1932) a minor was allowed damages in a suit for negli-

gent bodily injury against a brother who was slightly over twenty-one years of age but still
living with the family.
9 See Clarke v. Eighth Ave. Ry. Co., 238 N.Y. 246, 144 N.E. Si6 (X924); Durkee v. Central
Pac. R.R.Co., 56 Cal. 388 (i88o); Hamlin v. N.H. Bragg & Son, 129 Me. z6,
51 AUt. 197
(1930).
10 Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 Atl. 889 (1914); Johnson v. Johnson, 2or Ala. 41, 77
So. 335 (1917); Crowell v. Crowell, 18o N.C. Si6, xo 5 S.E. 2o6 (1920); 27 11. L. Rev. 314

(1932).
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gence suits by a woman against her husband have been allowed," the statutes giving
married women the right to sue in their own names have been the basis of recovery,
the courts saying that the disability to sue their husbands has been removed by implication. Characteristically, conceptual jurisprudence has provided an inroad and
recovery has been allowed against the employers of a negligent person who was a
member of the family of the plaintiff although the same courts would have denied
recovery against the employee directly.- Other manifestations of this approach are
not wanting. A suit by the administrator of the estate of a daughter negligently killed
by her father was not considered a suit by the mother against her husband, although
the administrator brought suit for her benefit,3 and a father was allowed to recover
from his daughter's husband for her wrongful death, regardless of the fact that the
daughter could not have recovered for her injuries had she survived.'4
On principle there appears to be no reason for not allowing members of the family
group recourse to the courts for an orderly adjudication of their claims against each
other. But it must also be remembered that resort to the courts is infrequent unless an
insurance company is involved and precaution should be taken to protect the insurer
against collusion and other kinds of fraud as well as against liability for a risk which
it has not assumed by the policy.
Injunctions-Possibility of Clarification by Declaratory Judgment-[Federal].The plaintiff in a suit for unfair competition obtained a final decree restraining the
defendant from the use of a trade name and from selling its product in a form similar
to the plaintiff's. Thereafter the defendant filed a supplementary petition in the same
court requesting a determination as to whether its recently initiated plan for marketing its product would violate the injunction. Held, in denying the petition, that such
a procedure is contrary to the settled practice in the district and circuit and, moreover,
calls upon the court to render an advisory opinion. Kellogg Co. v. NationalBiscuit Co.'
"1Wait v. Pierce, 1g1 Wis. 202, 2o9 N.W. 475 (1926); Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P"
(2d) 740 (x935); Miltimore v. Milford Motor Co., 197 Atl. 330 (N.H. 1938).
1 Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928); Koontz v.
Messer, 320 Pa. 487, x8i AUt. 792 (i935); Pittsley v. David, ii N.E. (2d) 461 (Mass. i937).
13 Albrecht v. Potthoff, 192 Minn. 557, 257 N.W. 377 (1934).
'4 Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, 321 Pa. 438, 184 Atl. 663 (1936). The court here said that
as the derivation of the action was the tortious act itself, it came to the parties, entitled by
statute to sue, free from the personal disabilities arising from the relationship between the
deceased and the wrongdoer.
'22 F. Supp. 8oi (Del. 1938). This case has become moot because the Supreme Court
recently decided that the Kellogg Co. was not guilty of unfair competition. For the history of
the litigation see National Biscuit Co. v. Kellogg Co., 9i F. (2d) i5o (C.C.A. 3d 1937) injunction granted, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 733 (1937). On January 5, 1938, the district court issued a
permanent injunction pursuant to the order of the circuit court of appeals. The petition in the
instant case was presented on January 20, 1938. Subsequently, the defendant, Kellogg Co.,
petitioned the circuit court of appeals for a recall of its mandate ordering the injunction to be
issued "for purposes of clarification." National Biscuit Co. v. Kellogg Co., 96 F. (2d) 873
(C.C.A. 3 d 1938). On reconsideration the Supreme Court granted certiorari,58 S. Ct. 1052
(1938), and reversed, Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 59 S. Ct. 109 (1938), rehearing
denied, 59 S. Ct. 246 (1938). For a case in accord with the Supreme Court decision see Canadian Shredded Wheat Co. v. Kellogg Co., [1938] 2 D.L.R. 145.

